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Abstract 
This paper examines the financial stress interconnectedness among GIIPS economies 
and Germany. Based on market level financial stress indices, it examines the stress 
transmission process as well as the causal network relationships in banking sector, 
bond, money and stock markets. The period under investigation, 2001-2013, allows 
to test the effects of financial crisis of 2008 as well as the subsequent European 
sovereign crisis. Using two alternative techniques for connectedness analysis, our 
evidence suggests that the peripheral economies of Italy and Spain play a highly 
significant role in the stress transmission in all markets, especially in the cases of 
banks and equity markets. Moreover, we visualize our results using network 
analysis. Contrary to common wisdom, Portugal, Ireland, and mainly Greece, do not 
seem to have an important role in amplifying stress levels. 
Keywords: Eurozone, stress transmission, connectedness analysis, spillovers, 
networks 
JEL Codes: C43, G15, F30 
1. Introduction   
The recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its multifaceted nature have 
seriously affected the global economy. As a rare event, sparsely happening to 
advanced economies, has taken by surprise the governments of the hardly hit 
economies. This was reflected on their delayed response, which in many cases did 
not prove adequate to tame the effects of the financial crisis. A crisis that started 
from a relatively minor US financial market soon became a major threat for the 
global financial stability. This tidal effect has seriously affected European markets, 
causing troubles to European banks and sovereigns. Interestingly, due to the 
heightening uncertainty, the European crisis emerged as an issue of excessive 
sovereign risk for the most debt-ridden countries. 
The severity of the GFC reflects on the unprecedented reaction of the fiscal 
and financial authorities on a global scale. Both Federal Reserve (FED) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) intervened to tame the effects of the financial 
upheaval, with EC”’s asset side of its balance sheet reaching Řŗ% of Euro “rea GDP 
in 2015 (25% for FED) and US government spending 20 trillion US dollars for bailing 
out troubled financial institutions. On the other hand, European governments spent 
at least 312 billion euros for the same purpose (MacDonald et al., 2018). On top of 
that, the GFC seriously influenced the real economy. Most countries went through a 
prolonged recessionary period, with some of them suffering substantial losses of 
their national income (Greece lost almost a quarter of its pre-crisis GDP and Spanish 
economy contracted for more than 9% cumulatively during crisis years, with 
skyrocketing unemployment rates). Several are still under severe macroeconomic 
strains, directly affecting their recovery prospects and causing social unrest. The lack 
of sustainable financial systems, along with the inability of banking markets to 
properly function and supply necessary credit for a fast recovery, sets the stage for 
rather gloomy conditions for the economies in trouble. Within this framework, it is 
reasonable to expect that recent research focuses on the identification of the potential 
contagion and interdependency channels among different economies. Especially for 
the case of Eurozone, it is even more interesting, given the importance of these 
economies on a global scale, the highly interconnected markets, the level of 
integration of these economies and the transformative nature of the financial 
meltdown in this region. 
Aspired by the aforementioned events, we aim to identify empirically the 
potential risk transmission channels among the Euro Area economies. In order to 
achieve this task, we analyze the interactions among the peripheral and core 
countries’ financial markets. This disaggregated, time-varying analysis, covering a 
wide number of markets (namely, four markets for each economy under 
consideration: banking sector, money market, equity and bond markets), is 
materialized on two levels: both within each group of financial markets, as well as 
on cross market level. In this way, further insights to the root causes of the Euro 
Area crisis are provided. Our study adds to the ongoing debate on which markets or 
countries contributed the most to the crisis exacerbation. 
The present study adds to this literature. Its contribution can be summarized 
as follows. First, in contrast to most of the prior literature, we employ innovative, 
custom-made Financial Stress Indices (FSIs), representing a unique dataset able to 
capture the fluctuations of the markets financial stress level. These indices are 
aggregate indicators, the composition of which represents the most important 
characteristics of the financial markets under consideration. Such a metric is also 
useful as an indicator of forthcoming excessive market distress conditions. Second, 
our dataset covers a wide number of markets and Eurozone countries, offering the 
opportunity for more detailed exploration of the stress transmission channels. This 
disaggregated analysis is an important further step to identify the exact spillover 
effects within the common currency area and assess the relevant policy implications. 
Third, we employ two supplementary methodologies in order to analyze financial 
connectedness. Specifically, we use the Diebold-Yilmaz (2014, 2015) connectedness 
analysis as well as an innovative causality modelling approach introduced by Billio 
et al. (2012). Both frameworks are able to identify and accurately measure the degree 
of interconnectedness and the stress transmission effects among the examined 
economies and markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this 
framework is used for the Eurozone crisis co-movement and spillover effects 
analysis. Finally, we use network graph analysis to offer a visual representation of 
the interconnection channels among the European financial markets. In this way, the 
complex nature of the directional stress transmission effects can be properly 
understood and assessed. We also conduct a sub-sample analysis, in order to 
provide a detailed exposition of the evolution of interdependencies in the Eurozone 
financial markets and the ensuing financial stress effects. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a review of the 
relevant literature is provided. Section 3 presents the FSIs construction method and 
the baseline econometric model. In section 4, the average and dynamic spillover 
analysis, based on the dynamic VAR-based framework, is discussed. Section 5 
presents further evidence based on the second methodological tool employed here, 
while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Spillover analysis is commonly used to identify and evaluate the effects of 
both monetary and fiscal policies (Caporale and Girardi, 2013; Chen et al., 2016). In 
this study, we focus on Euro Area financial markets. Considerable effort has been 
made in order to examine the interconnections and the volatility transmission effects 
for the US and Eurozone crisis. This literature is part of the research aiming to 
identify whether contagion and spillover effects truly exist among international 
financial markets (Ehrmann et al., 2011; Jung and Maderitsch, 2014; Dungey and 
Garujel, 2015; Dungey and Renault, 2018). For instance, Apostolakis and 
Papadopoulos (2014, 2015), analyse the G7 economies markets and identify some 
effects between banking, securities and foreign exchange markets. Chau and 
Deesomsak (2014) examine the US crisis underlining the negative effects of debt and 
equity markets. Eichengreen et al. (2012) provide evidence that global banking 
system risks commove and this intensifies during periods of heightening financial 
turmoil. Studying the sovereign risk transmission between US, US states and 
Eurozone economies, Ang and Longstaff (2013) manage to exhibit much stronger 
systemic risk effects among Eurozone countries, compared to the US case. Most of 
the studies for Eurozone are confined to sovereign risk or banking distress 
transmission (Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2014; Gorea and Radev, 2014; Metiu, 2012), 
while others focus on the Greek case and its potential effects to the rest of the EMU 
countries (De Santis, 2014).  
VAR modelling is employed by some authors to analyze sovereign CDS for a 
number of European countries (Bruttin and Saure, 2015; Kohonen, 2014). 
“ntonakakis and Vergos ǻŘŖŗřǼ show that each country’s bond yields are mostly 
explained by their own forecast error variance. Claeys and Vasicek (2014) indicate 
that contagion is only evident during particular time periods for sovereign risk 
spillovers during the Euro Area crisis, something concurred by the work of Alter 
and Beyer (2014). Moreover, Minoiu et al. (2015) show that connectedness can be 
used as a tool for predicting financial crises. Event study analysis has also been 
applied to assess the news effects for Greek sovereign debt on European banks 
(Mink and de Haan, 2013), or the euro crisis effects on non-financial firms around 
the world (Claessens et al., 2015). The broad issue financial contagion and 
interconnectedness is not limited to Euro area that offers a natural observatory of 
studying the shocks’ transmissions among different economies that are under the 
same monetary framework. Other papers focus on the process of financial contagion 
in Latin American stock markets (Romero-Meza et al., 2015), the interconnectedness 
of Asian banks (Mensah and Premaratne, 2017) as well as spillover effects from US 
to Asian financial markets (Kim et al., 2015). 
 
3. Modelling Strategy 
3.1 Measuring Financial Stress 
The dataset of this study is based on financial stress indexes for Germany, as a proxy 
of Euro Area core and a set of Eurozone peripheral economies (namely Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). In order to examine several financial 
markets, we construct four financial distress indices for each one of the 
aforementioned economies. These indexes are indicators of the financial conditions 
in four main financial markets: banking, bond, money and equity. The inclusion of 
several individual financial indicators in a composite index is the main advantage of 
these stress indexes. In this way, we manage to capture important market features 
that would otherwise be neglected. The relevant literature (e.g. Cardarelli et al., 2011) 
has underlined the usefulness of FSIs as indicators for assessing financial stability 
and the degree of markets’ financial distress. 
The following table (Table 1) outlines the components of the market FSIs. Our 
choice relies on prior literature, the data availability on weekly basis, as well as the 
achievement of comparability for all sample economies. Data cover the period from 
2001.1 to 2013.9, so that both pre- and post-crisis period are included. Weekly data 
are preferable, in order to avoid any mismatching issues, due to public holidays or 
different trading days (Yiu et al., 2010). Raw data are collected from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. 
Table 1 here 
Based on the above assumptions, we end up with 21 variables in total. Seven 
indicators concern banking market, five for money and equity markets and four for 
the bond market. This set of metrics aims to provide full coverage of different types 
of financial risks. Turning to the banks case, the stand-alone indicators represent 
risks associated with their activities, as well as measures of profitability, market 
value and operational efficiency. In more details, volatility risk is captured by the 
bank equities realized volatility, the bank stocks’ beta and the ǻnegatively singedǼ 
equities returns. Profitability is also important indicator for banks’ health and price-
to-earnings ratio is used to exhibit this characteristic. Turnover volume indicates the 
investor’s sentiment and uncertainty towards the developing market conditions. The 
level of default risk for banks is provided by the dividend yield and their market 
value. 
Credit and counterparty risk, together with interbank liquidity conditions are 
represented to the money market index. TED spread (the spread between the 3-
month Euribor from respective Treasury bills) is expected to increase in periods of 
worsening financial conditions. Moreover, changing liquidity conditions are 
evaluated based on the spreads of the main refinancing rate from the short term (2-
year and 3-year) governmental bond yields. We use negative signs for these spreads, 
as their negative values exhibit higher financial stress. The realized volatility of 
treasury bill of the countries under investigation is indicator of volatility risk as the 
one mentioned in the banking sector. Finally, the inverted term spread is a metric of 
market perceived default risk and financial strains. 
For the case of equity markets, we employ (negatively signed) stock returns, 
which are indicator of market uncertainty. Higher price variation coincides with 
heightening financial stress. Listed firms default risk and a measure of credibility are 
the Market value and dividend yields, as in the case of banking markets. P/E ratio is 
representative of firms’ financial sustainability. Additionally, the equities realized 
volatility indicates the degree of historical risk perception for each stock market. 
Metrics of the sovereign and the private sector default risks are the 
components of the bond sub-index. Specifically, sovereign spread is the spread 
between each country’s ŗŖ-year government bond yields from the German bond, 
which is a safe haven investment proxy. The perceived level of volatility risk in this 
market is measured by the realized volatility, while government bond duration is an 
indicator of increasing financial stress and uncertainty. As Lee et al. (2011) show, 
bond duration decreases, especially for bonds with lower ratings. Hence, countries 
with low credit ratings and worsening macroeconomic fundamentals might exhibit 
decreasing bond duration. 
The aggregate stress indices are calculated based on principal component 
analysis (PCA). PCA analysis is a multivariate statistical method aiming to 
reconstruct large datasets, by obtaining linear combinations of the variables in our 
dataset. This method decomposes series variability, ascending them in accordance to 
the dataset correlations. The series covariance matrix is decomposed, according to its 
eigenvalues, to the principal components that are orthogonal to each other. Based to 
this decomposition, each linear combination of the original variables (i.e. the 
principal components) is independent from the rest. They also provide a unique 
loading (weight) for each one of the original variables to the new dataset 
combinations. We employ the first principal component loadings as weight for each 
variable, since the first eigenvector interpret most of the initial series co-movement.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
We use the spillover analysis originally developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 
2014, 2015). The analysis is based on VAR modelling and the resulting estimation of 
variance decompositions. Specifically, this approach provides information about the 
contributions of variables’ shocks to the forecast error variances of all the variables 
of the model. This model is briefly written as N-variable VAR: 
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where 1 1 2 2 ...j j j p j pA A A A      . In this paper, we follow the work of Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2012; 2015) in which they use the generalized VAR modelling approach 
based on the previous work of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). Under 
this framework, the variance decompositions are invariant to the variable ordering. 
Specifically, the ij entry of the H-step-ahead variance decomposition is equal to  
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where jj is the standard deviation of e for the jth equation,  is the variance matrix of 
e. The drawback of the generalized VAR modelling is that the own and cross-
variable variance contributions shares do not equal to one. This is circumvented by 
using the normalization;  
 
1
( )( )
( )
ij
ij N
ij
j
z H
z H
z H
   (4) 
where 
1
( ) 1
N
ij
j
z H  and , 1 ( )N iji j z H N  . 
Given the above the total spillover index is equal to 
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The number of this index shows the average contribution of spillovers from shocks 
to all variables to the total forecast error variance. Alternatively, the spillover index 
gives the degree of the connectedness of the N-variables system. The main 
advantage of this analysis is that the directional spillovers can be easily calculated. 
More precisely, the directional spillovers received by variable i from all the other 
variables are defined as 
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Also, the directional spillover transmitted by the variable i to all the other variables 
are defined as 
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The merit of this analysis is shown by the fact that its basic results can be 
summarized in one single table. Such a summary-table is demonstrated in Table 1. 
The main panel of the table contains the contribution of shock in variable j (shown in 
column j) to the forecast error variance of variable i (shown in row i). In this way, the 
last column shows the total effects (spillovers) received by i (variable shown in row 
i) from all the rest. Correspondingly, the bottom row shows the contribution of each 
variable shown in column j to the rest variables. Finally, the total spillover index (SI), 
which is the average measure of connectedness, appears in as the bottom right 
number of the table.  
Another interesting feature of this method is the computation of net 
spillovers. These indicators are useful as they show whether a variable is net shock 
receiver or transmitter. They are defined as the difference between the total 
spillovers from i to j and the total spillovers from j to i; that is,  
 
 i i j i jNSI DSI DSI     (8) 
In this paper we mainly focus on total and net spillovers. Interestingly, we do 
not restrict ourselves to the above-mentioned measures. Their main feature is that 
they are static. This means that they are calculated for the whole period under study. 
However, the period that we examine in this study contains certain sub-periods of 
special interest. Therefore, static analysis may omit several aspects of stress 
transmission. For this reason, we calculate the dynamic version of spillover analysis 
using rolling estimation with a 200-weeks window1. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Static Spillover Analysis 
The average spillover effects among Euro Area markets are presented in Table 2. 
Results are illustrative of the particular significance of each economy’s market to the 
stress transmission to the rest. For instance, Italy’s and Spain’s effects are 
pronounced in all markets. Their values in the last row of each table are the highest 
suggesting that they are the major risk transmitters. To start with, the case of the 
banking sector is indicative of this evidence. More precisely, we see that the highest 
stress transmission to others stems from Italian and Spanish banking sectors. 
Specifically, a stress shock in Italian (Spanish) banks is responsible for 22% (39%) of 
the forecast error variance of the distress level to other bank markets. German and 
Portuguese banking stress have less significant contribution with 8% each.  Greek 
contribution is also low with a level of 12%. This evidence is in accordance with 
Mink and de Haan (2013), indicating the limited exposure of European banks to 
Greece.  As far as the bond sector is concerned, the contribution of each country is 
much lower, apart from Italy’s and Spain. Specifically, both Italian and Spanish 
bonds contribute 35% and 32%, respectively to the variance of other bonds indexes 
included in the analysis. Regarding the core economy, German bond stress only 
explains 12% of the overall risk transmission. It is interesting to underline the 
                                                          
1 We also use 300 and 400-weeks as window. The results remain the same.  
negligible effect of the debt-ridden countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). In 
contrast to common wisdom, they do not either transmit to or receive from the rest 
of the peripheral economies or Germany. Interestingly, Italian and Spanish bond 
markets demonstrate strong bidirectional effects. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
In accordance to our last finding for the bond market, the money markets 
from/to Italy and Spain show the highest directional spillovers. This is clear evidence 
of the interdependence between the two largest peripheral economies, as well as 
their exposure to common liquidity problems. Another important outcome is the 
moderate, though relatively important, stress transmission between the 
aforementioned economies and Germany. This reflects the importance of these three 
economies within Euro Area and their high degree of interconnectedness. As it is 
evident from the dynamic analysis that follows, ȃflight to qualityȄ phenomenon 
occurs within the examined period.  
The most interdependent marketplace is the stock market, with an average 
spillover index of 67.5%. A stress shock in Italian equity market contributes as high 
as 83% to the forecast variance error of the remaining five variables. A similar 
behavior is identified for the Spanish case, with the corresponding percentage being 
equal to 82%. Contrary to the previous sectors, a stress shock in Eurozone core has a 
high, though less than the Italian and Spanish, contribution (76%). As in the 
previously examined markets, the Greek, Irish and Portuguese contribution is 
significantly less important. Overall, it is fair to argue that the equity markets seem 
to be more interconnected, given the faster information flow and absorption from 
investors’ sentiment. This sentiment reflects on stock prices and their swift 
adjustment to changing market conditions2.  
An alternative depiction of the above results is the usage of network graphs. 
Based on the work of Demirer et al. (2017) and Diebold et al. (2017), we visualize the 
connectedness found by the spillover analysis. Figures 1-4 show relationships as an 
interrelated network based on Table 2. Each node indicates each unit under 
examination (banking FSIs in graph 1, bond FSIs in graph 2, money FSIs in graph 3 
and stock FSIs in graph 4). The edge thickness (and color) indicates the average 
pairwise directional spillovers. This means that a thicker (blue or darker grey in 
greyscale) edge shows a higher spillover. On the other hand, a thinner (red or lighter 
grey in greyscale) edge shows a lower spillover. In a similar fashion, the arrow size 
indicates the pairwise directional connectedness ȃtoȄ and ȃfromȄ. Each node 
location is determined by using the ForceAtlas2 algorithm of Jacomy et al. (2014) in 
Gephi. This algorithm finds a steady state, where repelling and attracting forces 
balance each other. Each node is attracted by others according to average pairwise 
directional connectedness ȃtoȄ and ȃfromȄ. The network graphs show with a quite 
straightforward way the significant role of Italian, Spanish and German indexes in 
all the markets. At the same time, the reader can easily identify the less significant 
roles of the remaining countries, as their corresponding nodes are more isolated and 
linked with darker color edges.  
In order to ensure the robustness of our result, we repeated the same analysis 
using the equal-variance approach (EVA), instead of PCA. According to EVA, all 
individual indicators contribute equally to the final stress index. Before the 
aggregation, each one of the metrics is standardized by deducting each series mean 
and divide with the standard deviation. The results remain almost the same. The 
only difference is the total interconnectedness of the banking sector. Using EVA, the 
total spillover index is higher. We attribute this difference to the main drawback of 
                                                          
2 To test the robustness, we repeat the analysis by using only realized volatility. The results are 
qualitatively and quantitative the same.   
static analysis3; that is, its inability to take into account switches and changes that 
take place during our examined period that evolves significant economic events. In 
this way, the average analysis may not be appropriate, especially when the period 
under examination contains lots of major economic events. One way to overcome 
this shortcoming is the employment of dynamic analysis4.  
Figure 1 here 
Figure 2 here 
Figure 3 here 
Figure 4 here 
 
4.2 Dynamic Spillover Analysis 
Using 200-week rolling window, we calculate the dynamic total spillover indexes for 
each individual market shown in Figure 5. Several interesting outcomes are found. 
Firstly, both bank and stock markets exhibit a substantial increase during mid-2008, 
reaching a maximum of roughly 60% and 74%, respectively. This means that the 
total variance of the forecast errors for these two markets is explained by the 
markets’ own shocks. Until the end of the sample, both markets’ spillovers remain 
elevated, with a slight decrease during mid-2012 and 2013. Bond market 
interconnectedness follows an increasing trend, even though it deescalates at the end 
of the sample. We observe three major peaks; in the beginning of 2006, second half of 
2008 and in 2011. The last two upswings coincide with two major events of financial 
meltdown: the Lehman Brothers collapse and the Euro Area sovereign crisis 
outbreak. On contrary, money market is the least volatile, following a constantly 
                                                          
3 According to PCA analysis the main drivers behind the banking stress index are: i) realised 
volatility, ii) the turnover by volume, iii) price/earnings ratio, iv) banking sector betas. Repeating the 
same analysis keeping only the realised volatility, the outcomes remain almost the same with the ones 
received from PCA. We thank an anonymous referee for stressing this issue.  
4 Interestingly, the dynamic spillover indexes for banking sector provided by PCA and EVA are very 
similar with the correlation coefficient being equal to 0.97.  
declining trend. Through time, the shocks in this market are gradually explained by 
other factors than those represented by the money and interbank funding markets. 
 
Figure 5 here 
 
Turning now to the market level analysis, we begin by examining the 
dynamic net spillover effects in the banking sectors of the economies under 
consideration (Figure 6). Given the fact that we focus on four markets of six 
countries (twenty-four cases in total), our discussion is based on the net spillovers. 
We report FROM-directional and TO-directional spillovers in the Appendix. Starting 
from the core, Germany remains for the whole period net receiver of shocks coming 
from the banking sector. This is pronounced during the turbulent period following 
the collapse of Lehman brothers in September 2008. During the period of European 
sovereign crisis, the core economy remains a net receiver even though in less extent. 
As expected Greece, being a net receiver during the GFC, becomes transmitter 
during the European crisis. The PSI-agreement, referring to the Greek government’s 
debt restructuring in February 2012, leaded to an increase of spillovers during that 
period. On the other hand, Ireland remains most of the time net transmitter before 
and during the GFC. Like the Greek case, the bailouts program in 2010 did not 
transform these two economies into transmitter of shocks. However, Ireland became 
for a short period a net transmitter. This period coincides with the announcement of 
stress tests and the rumors regarding the need of another bail-out program that 
eventually did not happen. Turning to the two big peripheral economies, Italy and 
Spain, our results suggest that these two economies constitute the main transmitters 
of shocks in banking sector. Even though they never participated in bailout 
programs, Italy and Spain’s seriously troubled banks received quite large financial 
support from the LTRO programme (Darracq-Paries and De Santis, 2015). Finally, 
Portuguese spillovers oscillate around zero with a noticeable drop starting in the 2nd 
quarter of 2011, when Portugal authorities accepted the bailout program in May 
2011. This reflects the increased vulnerability of Portuguese banks to shocks from 
other economies.   
Figure 6 here 
Regarding the bond markets (Figure 7), Italian and Spanish connectedness 
remains positive for most of the sample period. Both economies are the main shock 
transmitters in the bond market, especially since the beginning of the GFC. Similar 
pattern is observed for Ireland, up until the second quarter of 2010. Since then, there 
is a significant decline, coinciding with the bailout program agreed with the EU 
authorities in November 2010. As expected, Germany constantly remains a net 
receiver, as indicated by the negative values of its net interconnectedness index. On 
the same vein, Greece and Portugal exhibit a similar behavior. Nevertheless, when 
the Eurozone crisis emerged, they both turned into net stress transmitters. On 
average, countries that participated to official financial support programs (Greece, 
Portugal and in a less extent Ireland) tend to have a net positive contribution to the 
remaining economies. 
Figure 7 here 
In the case of money market (Figure 8), it is interesting to note the dominant 
role of Germany, Italy and Spain, as major stress transmitters. Even though, 
particularly for the case of Germany, the contribution to this markets’ instability 
sharply decreases after 2010, we can identify a gradually increasing positive effect 
towards the end of the sample period. All economies examined were susceptible to 
the credit crunch effect, stemmed from the US crisis peak in 2008. As in the case of 
bond markets, Greece and Ireland turned into transmitters since the onset of the 
sovereign crisis in Europe.  
Figure 8 here 
For the case of equity markets (Figure 9), Germany, Italy and Spain are the 
major shock transmitters throughout the whole period. This indicates the 
significance of these markets, as it is evident from their market value and 
contribution to the market risk transmission. At the same time, Greece and Portugal 
remain net receivers, indicating their limited influence on the Euro Area stock 
markets. Interestingly, at the peak of the GFC in 2008, all markets exhibit a 
significant switch to their stress transmission. In post-2007 period, noticeable 
changes take place. Firstly, Spain and Italy, along with Portugal, constitute the new 
group of shock transmitters, underscoring the significance of European periphery to 
the Euro crisis. Secondly, the role of German shock is almost eliminated as the net 
spillover index oscillates around zero. Ireland and, mainly, Greece remain the net 
receivers for all the post-crisis period. This is an indication of their greater exposure 
to external market shocks; apart from a small jump of the stress spillover indices 
around the time of Eurozone sovereign crisis outbreak, the indexes behavior remains 
unaltered5. 
Figure 9 here 
 
5. Further Evidence: Cross-market connectedness  
Having completed the market level analysis, we embark on the presentation and 
discussion of the cross-market stress spillover effects. The focus here is on the 
potential interconnections that can be identified among the different markets and 
countries discussed individually before. In this way, a more accurate and detailed 
exhibition of the disaggregated stress spillovers is provided, something conducted 
for the first time on the empirical research of financial stress transmission in the Euro 
area. Table 3 depicts the whole range of possible interdependences across Eurozone 
                                                          
5 As an additional robustness exercise, we included the St. Louis FED FSI as an extra variable to our 
VAR-specification. This variable is used as a proxy for the global financial conditions. The results are 
quantitatively the same and available upon request.  
financial markets. Overall, the cross-market interconnectedness is 58%, with 
significant variation depending on the markets. In more details, the equity markets, 
as well as the banking systems, are proved to be the sectors with the strongest 
bidirectional effects to each other. In accordance to the previous section, stock and 
banking sectors are the main stress transmitters to the rest of the markets. For the 
equity markets case, the average transmission to others is about 102%, while the 
corresponding percentage for bank markets is 66%. In contrast, sovereign risk 
transmission is not that evident for all cases under investigation. 
In particular, for the case of the banking sector, we can identify that Italian 
and Spanish banks are the major sources of instability for the Euro Area financial 
markets. Additionally, they transmit increasing stress to their own equity markets, 
while their effect on the German banks is noticeable. Germany is also influenced by 
the equity market conditions in Italy and Spain. In total, Greek, Portuguese and Irish 
banking systems are highly integrated and exposed to their own stress shocks. On 
the other hand, German markets are not influenced from financial stress variations 
in the three aforementioned economies. Overall, it is evident that a certain degree of 
segregation, in terms of the share of forecast error variance explained due to shocks 
elsewhere, appears in Eurozone markets. The core economy is more interconnected 
with the largest peripheral economies of Italy and Spain. A distinctive group of 
market interactions, within the smaller peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal) is formulated. This can be conceived as a call for policy makers to pay 
particular attention to these economies’ special characteristics. 
 
Table 3 here 
The case of bond markets is rather distinctive, in the sense that no conclusive 
evidence of its importance to stress transmission is identified. In fact, it is the market 
with the lowest degree of interconnectedness among the examined markets. It is 
interesting to underscore the Greek case. There is limited evidence that the 
transmission from the Greek bond market affects all the remaining Eurozone sectors; 
quite the contrary, it is a net stress receiver. At the same time, the Greek banking 
system is mainly exposed to Greek bond stress level. The outcome of the Greek 
sovereign risk and Greek banks’ connection reflects the negative effects from the PSI 
program and the resulting recapitalization needs of these financial institutions. In 
terms of bond stress transmission, we observe that Italy and Ireland are the main 
shock transmitters. Spanish case is also important, while regional shock effects are 
present in the interrelation of the Italian and Spanish bond stress. Regarding the 
Irish bonds spillover effect, they are present towards the money markets of the same 
country and Portugal. Overall, the Irish markets are mainly influenced from 
domestic shocks (i.e. shocks stemming from the examined Irish markets). 
Similar conditions prevail to the last two markets under scrutiny. Money 
market stress transmission is acute, for the case of Spain, Italy and Portugal. These 
effects are reflected in the same peripheral economies. For instance, the Spanish and 
Portuguese funding conditions (level of money market stress) have a direct influence 
to the Italian case and vice versa. Additionally, there is some evidence of strong ties 
between the German, Italian and Spanish money markets. For the rest of the 
countries of our sample, the conditions are rather tranquil. Finally, the case of equity 
markets is the one exhibiting the strongest spillover effects. In accordance to the 
results from the within-market level analysis, this sector demonstrates significant 
multidirectional effects among the stock markets. Again, the Spanish, along with the 
Italian and the Portuguese markets, are those with the most intensive stress 
transmission to the rest. Interestingly, they also have an effect to the German 
banking sector. On top of that, the interrelation of these three equity markets with 
the Italian and Spanish banks is also identified. 
The above analysis is visualized in the cross-market network in Figure 10. 
Despite the large number of examined units (nodes), the main findings described 
above are quite evident. The banking and the stock market nodes are quite 
interconnected as it is evident from the lower bottom nexus group. Also, one can 
identify the closed interlinks between Italian and Spanish nodes and the limited role 
played by the Greek ones.  
 
Figure 10 here 
 
Additional to the cross market static results, we also provide their 
corresponding dynamic version. Due to the great number of markets, we only 
present the total dynamic spillover index6. The dotted line in Figure 12 shows that 
the value of total spillover index remains high for the whole period with a jump 
taking place in the beginning of the financial turmoil in late 2008. As an alternative 
way to test the robustness of our results we use an alternative measure of 
connectedness; that is, the causality index developed by Bilio et al. (2012). Contrary 
to the Diebold-Yilmaz methodology, it is based on pairwise Granger causality tests. 
The causality index is the ratio of pairwise combinations for which a Granger-
causality exists to the total number of pairwise combinations. A high percentage 
means that the system under examination is highly interconnected. In other words, 
the value of causality can be interpreted as a measure of spillover effects among the 
examined markets. The main advantage is that there is no need for any assumption 
regarding VAR modelling that, subsequently, affects the variance-covariance matrix. 
On the other hand, the drawback of this measure is its pairwise nature that neglects 
cross sectional effects. Overall, we consider this measure as a complement to the 
Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index. In a similar vein with the analysis performed in the 
previous section, we calculate both the static and the dynamic causality index.  
 
Figure 11 here 
 
                                                          
6 All the gross and net indexes are available upon request. 
In our case of 24 markets, we examine all the �! ሺ� − 2ሻ! = 552⁄  pairwise 
combinations and we find that the causality index is 17.2%. The dynamic causality 
index (dci) presents excessive variation (solid line of Figure 12). From 2004 until 
mid-2007 the dci is around 17%. After that there is a small increase and the dci 
reaches 20%. Interestingly, the index reaches its maximum of 28% during the last 
months of 2008. For the remaining period until 2013, dci follows a declining trend, 
oscillating around 20%, without reverting to its lower pre-crisis level. Despite the 
differences in these two measures, the conclusion remains the same; the examined 
markets remain interconnected in a certain extent, irrespective of what measure we 
use. Moreover, the variations of this interconnectedness follow similar patterns for 
both proxies. After the peak of late 2008, both indices follow a slow de-escalating 
trend. Until the end 2013, they do not seem to have reached the pre-crisis levels. 
In order to shed more light on the complex nature of market linkages, we 
employ Granger-causality network plots. Each plot illustrates the whole amount of 
Granger causal relations in a specific point of time. This is a visualization of 
connectedness of Euro area financial markets. Each statistically significant Granger 
causal relation is depicted with a line connecting the two markets (nodes). Since the 
dci calculation is based on 200-week rolling window, we result with more than 460 
observations of this index. Due to this large amount, we present a network graph for 
only two points in time. Figure 12 is drawn for the pre-crisis period, while Figure 13 
is drawn for the post-crisis period. A first comparison of these two network plots 
show that the markets are more interdependent in the second period. Specifically, 
the money, bank and bond markets show a significant increase to their 
interconnections with markets of both peripheral and core economies. The 
increasing interconnectedness is rather intensive for the bond markets in Italy and 
Spain. A similar effect is identified for the same countries’ banking sectors. The 
equity markets remain highly interlinked, as they were in the period before the GFC 
outbreak. In total, these plots clearly show that, through time, the Euro Area 
markets’ integration and susceptibility to financial distress level has increased. 
 Figure 12 here 
Figure 13 here 
 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This study provides a thorough and detailed examination of the 
interdependencies and stress transmission channels between the Euro Area core and 
peripheral economies. This research is carried out using a set of financial stress 
indices, representing the prevailing financial conditions for a number of different 
financial markets for the GIIPS and Germany, as a representative of the core Euro 
Area. Using a battery of modern econometric tools, we provide a detailed overview 
of the linkages between the European markets and an identification of stress 
diffusion channels. 
The results are in a certain extent challenging of the concerns policy makers 
expressed back at the time of the Eurozone crisis peak. Overall, the Italian and 
Spanish markets are the most influential ones, in terms of their risk transmission 
effect to the rest of the European markets. Especially, for the case of equity market 
and banking sector, this effect is prominent, exhibiting these countries’ importance 
and sizable effect to the common currency area. The sovereign risk transmission, as 
represented by the bond market analysis shows no different results. Once again, 
Spain and Italy are the major variation transmitters, towards both the core and the 
peripheral countries. It is noteworthy that Greece, along with the rest of the small 
peripheral markets, do not constitute an influential contributor to the stress 
transmission. Their role is negligible, making their effects slightly more evident in 
cases of extreme financial events, such as the initial period of Euro Area crisis. These 
findings concur to the recent literature (for instance, González-Hermosillo and 
Johnson, 2014). 
On top of the above, further empirical insights are identified. Beyond the 
importance of banks and equity markets as risk transmitters, we highlight their 
strong bidirectional effects. Their role is important, as well as their susceptibility to 
increasing distress effects. Additionally, money market stress spillovers from Spain 
and Germany are evident, with the Italian and Portuguese case becoming more 
influential in the period after the GFC outbreak. Notably, the examination of the 
post-crisis period shows a significantly increasing degree of interconnectedness 
among the examined Euro Area markets. Especially, for the case of GIIPS countries, 
it is fair to say that they are mainly affected by their own shocks. This is important, 
as they seem to react to the changing nature of financial stress transmission as a 
distinctive region. These results are verified by a series of robustness checks. 
Based on our analysis, a couple of useful policy recommendations can be 
made. Firstly, the spillover analysis of financial stress indexes, as applied here, can 
be used as a tool for evaluating markets’ financial instability. Their value added can 
be advantageous for both central bankers, as well as markets participants. Moreover, 
the necessity to monitor financial stance in a wide number of financial markets is 
imperative, as suggested by the increasing complexity in markets interrelations. This 
increasingly intensified stress diffusion is a clear call for a multidimensional and 
internationally coordinated regulatory framework, able to accommodate the adverse 
effects of financial crashes. 
Despite the multifaceted nature of crisis episodes, the key role of banking 
sector and money market conditions underscore the importance of liquidity, funding 
availability and the maintenance of sound capital base for financial institutions. It is 
reasonable to put forth the importance of the full implementation of regulatory 
capital requirements, as prescribed by Basel Accord and the European supervisory 
authorities. Macroprudential policies, facilitating the multidirectional nature of 
adverse financial episodes, should be fully applied, with the aim of enhancing 
financial stability. In order to do this, it is also necessary to adjust monetary policy, 
by setting clear targets on financial shocks accommodation. Until now, most 
monetary authorities still have no such a policy mandate update. Nevertheless, the 
policies implemented during the recent crisis (namely, emergency liquidity 
assistance, quantitative easing) aim to overcome liquidity and uncertainty issues and 
seem to be to the right direction. Finally, another implication of our study is the 
degree of regionalism of the examined peripheral economies. This brings the 
discussion of the desirability of ȃone size fits allȄ policies to the fore. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Components of Financial Stress Indices 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banking Sector Money Market
Dividend Yield TED Spread
Market Value Inverted Term Spread
Turnover by Volume Treasury Bill Realized Volatility
Price/Earnings ratio Main Refinancing Rate - 2yr Government Bond Yield
Bank Equities Realized Volatility Main Refinancing Rate - 5yr Government Bond Yield
Banking Sector Beta
Bank Equities Returns
Equity Market Bond Market
Stock Returns Sovereign Spread
Dividend Yield Government Bond Realized Volatility
Price/Earnings ratio Corporate Spread
Stocks Realized Volatility Government Bond Duration
Market Value
Variables Used in Financial Stress Indices
Table 2: Average Spillovers for Euro Area markets using PCA-based FSIs 
A-Banking Sector 
 
 
B-Bond Markets 
 
 
C-Money Markets 
 
 
D-Equity Markets 
 
Note: Total, directional and pairwise spillovers are summarized in each Table. Table A refers to banking sector, 
Table B refers to bond market, Table C refers to equity market and Table D refers to money market.   
Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Contribution from others
Germany 84.3 3.2 0.5 0.6 0.1 11.2 16
Greece 2.6 90.1 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.6 10
Ireland 0.6 2.3 88.4 1.1 1.9 5.7 12
Italy 0.4 1.7 1 77.9 2.6 16.3 22
Portugal 0.2 2.1 1.2 2.7 90.4 3.3 10
Spain 4.3 2.8 3.1 15.6 1.5 72.7 27
Contribution to others 8 12 7 22 8 39 16.00%
Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Contribution from others
Germany 95.4 3.1 0.6 0.1 0 0.8 5
Greece 2.4 91.5 0.5 3.1 1.7 0.8 9
Ireland 0.2 0.7 94 1.3 1.4 2.4 6
Italy 0.1 2.1 1 67.8 2.5 26.5 32
Portugal 0 2.9 0.6 3.5 91.6 1.3 8
Spain 0.5 0.9 1.9 26.8 0.8 69.1 31
Contribution to others 3 10 5 35 6 32 15.10%
Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Contribution from others
Germany 69.4 2.8 0.7 13.2 1.2 12.7 31
Greece 2.7 82.7 1.7 5.8 3.5 3.6 17
Ireland 1.1 1.7 59.1 12.3 15 10.8 41
Italy 8.2 3.4 10.9 43.1 7.4 27.1 57
Portugal 1.6 3 14.7 10.5 61.7 8.5 38
Spain 8 2 11.4 28.3 6.1 44.3 56
Contribution to others 22 13 39 70 33 63 40%
Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Contribution from others
Germany 30.4 8.8 13.3 18.4 12 17.1 70
Greece 12.2 43.3 9.7 11.9 11.3 11.5 57
Ireland 15.8 8.7 39.7 14 9.4 12.4 60
Italy 17.4 8.3 11.5 30.9 12.6 19.4 69
Portugal 13.7 9.5 9.7 15.8 36.2 15.1 64
Spain 16.6 8.1 10.6 20.3 12.6 31.8 68
Contribution to others 76 43 55 80 58 76 64.60%
Table 3: Average Cross-Market Spillovers 
 
Note: Total, directional and pairwise spillovers are summarized in this Table. The most important effects are highlighted in bold. GE stands for Germany, GR stands for 
Greece, IR stands for Ireland, IT stands for Italy, PO stands for Portugal, SP stands for Spain. BANK refers to banking sector, BOND refers to bond market, MONEY refers to 
money market and STOCK refers to equity market.
GE_BANK GR_BANK IR_BANK IT_BANK PO_BANK SP_BANK GE_BOND GR_BOND IR_BOND IT_BOND PO_BOND SP_BOND GE_MONEY GR_MONEY IR_MONEY IT_MONEY PO_MONEY SP_MONEY GE_STOCK GR_STOCK IR_STOCK IT_STOCK PO_STOCK SP_STOCK From others
GE_BANK 21.3 2 2.8 8.6 4.5 7.9 0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 10.3 4 6.6 11.3 6.3 10.7 79
GR_BANK 2.6 35 2.5 5.4 3.7 4.3 0.3 1.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.4 3.9 18.7 3.2 4.9 5.3 4.7 65
IR_BANK 3 2.4 29.2 6 4.6 8.3 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.5 5.2 5.3 9.3 6.8 7 7.6 71
IT_BANK 6.5 2.5 3.6 18 6.4 8.5 0.1 0.4 0.6 0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.7 1 0.7 0.9 7.1 5.1 6.2 12.8 6.5 11.2 82
PO_BANK 5.5 3 3.6 7.5 28.1 5 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 4.5 5.3 3.6 7 11.7 8.3 72
SP_BANK 6.9 1.3 5.1 10.8 4.6 19.7 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 7 5.3 5.5 9.8 6.7 13.2 80
GE_BOND 0.4 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 73.9 0.4 1.5 3.8 0.6 6.9 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.6 1 1.8 0.5 1 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 26
GR_BOND 1.3 0.7 0.5 2.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 82.3 0.8 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.8 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.8 0.9 18
IR_BOND 0.4 0.7 1.6 0.3 1.8 0.6 1.3 0.7 63.2 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.6 11.6 1.3 7.1 1.8 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.1 37
IT_BOND 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.6 2.6 1.6 1.2 53.5 0.8 13.2 2.1 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 2.8 2.3 3 2.2 2.4 47
PO_BOND 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 1.1 0.6 84.7 0.3 1 0.4 1 0.1 4.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.1 15
SP_BOND 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.3 4.7 0.4 1.1 16.3 0.5 64.9 0.3 0 0.4 1.3 0.7 2.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 35
GE_MONEY 2 0.5 1.5 1.5 1 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.3 45.8 3 1 8.3 5.2 14.2 1.7 0.9 3.3 3.2 1.5 2 54
GR_MONEY 0.3 1.5 0.2 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.9 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.1 4.7 79.6 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.1 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.7 20
IR_MONEY 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.7 9.6 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.5 0.3 54.8 5.3 10 6.1 0.4 0.9 0.7 1 1.2 1.6 45
IT_MONEY 1.2 0.5 0.7 2.5 1.7 1.5 0.5 0.3 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 7.7 0.1 4.3 42.1 8.1 16.7 0.7 1 1.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 58
PO_MONEY 1.2 0.2 0.3 1.6 2 1.3 0.6 0.2 4.4 1.7 1.1 0.5 5 0.1 7.9 8.5 45.6 8.6 1 1.1 1 1.2 3 1.7 54
SP_MONEY 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.2 2 0.9 1.2 0.2 1.9 0.6 0.1 0.5 12.5 1 5.4 15.9 7.7 41.6 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.7 1.5 1.5 58
GE_STOCK 6.9 1.6 3.2 7.3 2.9 6.5 0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 19 5.4 9.6 13.6 8.9 12.9 81
GR_STOCK 3.3 12.7 2.5 6.2 4.7 4.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 6.6 26.1 6 8 7.6 7.4 74
IR_STOCK 3.6 1.7 6.3 6.4 2.8 5.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 10 6.1 25.1 10.6 8.1 9.7 75
IT_STOCK 6.5 1.7 3.2 10.2 4.2 6.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.4 11.2 5.1 8.3 17.6 8.5 13.2 82
PO_STOCK 4.3 2.2 3.6 6.1 8.3 5.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.4 1.1 1 0.6 8.8 6.2 7.3 10.2 20.8 10.8 79
SP_STOCK 5.9 1.6 3.5 8.8 5 8.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.6 10.4 4.9 7.8 12.8 9.1 17.6 82
to others 65 40 48 97 64 80 15 11 29 30 10 26 48 12 40 51 51 60 93 83 87 124 101 126 57.90%
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Figures 
Figure 1: Banking sector network graph 
 
Note: Each node represents the stress index of each economy’s index. Red ǻlight grey in greyscale) 
shows a lower spillover, while a blue (dark grey in greyscale) shows a higher spillover. Each 
thickness indicates average pairwise directional connectedness.  
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Figure 2: Bond markets network graph 
 
 
Note: Each node represents the stress index of each economy’s index. Red ǻlight grey in greyscaleǼ 
shows a lower spillover, while a blue (dark grey in greyscale) shows a higher spillover. Each 
thickness indicates average pairwise directional connectedness.  
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Figure 3: Money markets network graph 
 
 
Note: Each node represents the stress index of each economy’s index. Red ǻlight grey in greyscaleǼ 
shows a lower spillover, while a blue (dark grey in greyscale) shows a higher spillover. Each 
thickness indicates average pairwise directional connectedness.  
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Figure 4: Equity markets network graph 
 
 
Note: Each node represents the stress index of each economy’s index. Red ǻlight grey in greyscaleǼ 
shows a lower spillover, while a blue (dark grey in greyscale) shows a higher spillover. Each 
thickness indicates average pairwise directional connectedness.  
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Figure 5: Dynamic Spillover Indexes 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic total spillover indexes estimated using 200-week rolling windows. Bar areas 
indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
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Figure 6: Dynamic Net Spillover Indexes-Banking Sector 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic net spillover index estimated using 200-week rolling windows. Bar areas 
indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
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Figure 7: Dynamic Net Spillover Indexes-Bond Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic net spillover index estimated using 200-week rolling windows. Bar areas 
indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
1.
5
-
1
-
.
5
0
n
bo
nd
ge
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Germany
-
1
0
1
2
n
bo
nd
gr
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Greece
-
2
-
1
0
1
n
bo
nd
ir
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Ireland
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
n
bo
nd
it
2004w272007w262010w26 2013w26
time
Italy
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
n
bo
nd
po
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Portugal
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
n
bo
nd
sp
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Spain
39 
 
Figure 8: Dynamic Net Spillover Indexes Money Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic net spillover index estimated using 200-week rolling windows. Bar areas 
indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
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Figure 9: Dynamic Net Spillover Indexes-Stock Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic net spillover index estimated using 200-week rolling windows. Bar areas 
indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
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Figure 10: Cross-Market network graph 
 
 
 
 
Note: Each node represents the stress index of each market’s index. Red ǻlight grey in greyscaleǼ 
shows a lower spillover, while a blue (dark grey in greyscale) shows a higher spillover. Each 
thickness indicates average pairwise directional connectedness.  
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Figure 11:  Dynamic Spillover Index & Dynamic Causality Index 
 
Note: Solid line depicts the dynamic total spillover indexes estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows (left scale). Dotted line shows the dynamic causality index (right scale).  
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Figure 12: Granger Network before crisis 
 
Note: Each line represents a causal relation between two nodes/markets. 
Figure 13: Granger Network after crisis 
 
Note: Each line represents a causal relation between two nodes/markets.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers From each country-Banking Sector 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index from each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
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Figure A2:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers From each country-Bond Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index from each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
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Figure A3:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers From each country-Money Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index from each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
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Figure A4:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers From each country-Stock Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index from each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
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Figure A5:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers To each country-Banking Sector 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index to each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
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Figure A6:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers To each country-Bond Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index to each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
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Figure A7:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers To each country-Money Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index to each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
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Figure A8:  
Dynamic Directional Spillovers To each country-Stock Markets 
 
Note: Plot of dynamic directional spillover index to each country estimated using 200-week rolling 
windows. Bar areas indicate Eurozone recessions as calculated by CEPR business cycle dating 
committee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
.
5
11
11
.
5
12
12
.
5
st
oc
kg
et
o
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Germany
4
6
8
10
12
st
oc
kg
rto
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Greece
8
9
10
11
12
st
oc
ki
rto
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Ireland
10
10
.
5
11
11
.
5
12
12
.
5
st
oc
ki
tto
2004w272007w262010w26 2013w26
time
Italy
7
8
9
10
11
12
st
oc
kp
ot
o
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Portugal
10
10
.
5
11
11
.
5
12
12
.
5
st
oc
ks
pt
o
2004w27 2007w26 2010w26 2013w26
time
Spain
